I Introduction
Do …rm boundaries mediate the e¤ect of shocks to the …nancial intermediation sector? When the functioning of the intermediation sector is impaired -as was the case in the recent …nancial crisis -shocks can be transmitted to the broader economy since funds may not ‡ow to highest value use without incurring signi…cant cost. This issue has been extensively explored in the credit channel literature (e.g., Kashyap and Stein [2000] ; Bernanke and Blinder [1988; 1992] and Bernanke and Gertler [1995] ). However, unlike what is assumed in this literature, …rms may be able to reallocate resources internally -for instance, between divisions in di¤erent industries -to ameliorate the e¤ect of …nancial shocks. If so, external credit market conditions will impact the nature of resource allocation inside …rms and between industries di¤erently than they would in an economy with no internal capital markets. Diversi…ed …rms constitute a large part of economies around the world, 1 therefore resource allocation within …rms can be of signi…cant importance in determining macro outcomes such as business cycle ‡uctuations, total factor productivity and growth (eg. Bloom [2009] ). In this paper we propose and empirically verify that …rms shift resources between industries in response to shocks to the …nancial sector. We then estimate a structural model to quantify the forces driving this reallocation decision, and show that these forces dampen shocks to the …nancial sector in economically signi…cant ways. 2 We study the resource allocation problem in a sample of diversi…ed …rms in the U.S. Economists have used these …rms as a laboratory for studying resource allocation decisions inside …rms. There are two prevailing views on how capital is internally allocated in these …rms. Alchian [1969] and Stein [1997] , among others, have put forth the view that conglomerates may outperform external capital markets by virtue of exerting centralized control over the capital allocation process ('bright side'view). This view has been challenged by several studies, such as Rajan, Servaes and Zingales [2000] and Scharfstein and Stein [2000] who argue that resource allocation inside …rms is distorted towards weaker divisions by managerial socialistic concerns ('dark side'view). We propose and estimate a model with a dynamic tradeo¤ between the 'bright'and the 'dark'side of internal capital markets. In our setting, the cost of conglomerates arises from managerial preferences for corporate socialism. The bene…t is that funds can be allocated between divisions without experiencing frictions of accessing external capital markets. The cost of accessing external capital markets vary over time introducing a time varying wedge between the cost and bene…t of internal capital markets.
We …rst present reduced form evidence that motivate the economic forces in our structural model using data of diversi…ed …rms in the US from 1980 to 2006. We show that conglomerates' performance relative to stand-alone …rms improves during times in which external capital markets are impaired. Moreover, during these periods, conglomerates with more productivity dispersion among their divisions perform relatively better. Figure 1 plots the value of conglomerates with high 1 The Bureau of the Census reports that multi-industry …rms account for about half of the sales in the U.S in 2008. 2 To our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to estimate a structural model of capital allocation within conglomerates. For other structural models with credit market frictions see Einav, Jenkins and Levin [2010] , Whited [2006] , and Bloom [2009] . productivity dispersion relative to the value of conglomerates with low productivity dispersion. It shows that the di¤erence in these values narrows with an increase in the TED spread, our measure of external capital market distress. We also show that these valuation results are correlated with changes in capital allocation across divisions. These facts suggest that …rms with high productivity dispersion among their divisions shift resources between industries in response to shocks to the …nancial sector.
This reduced form evidence allows us to track only the net bene…t or cost of resource allocation inside the …rm. However, our goal is to identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation and how these forces change as the external capital markets change. These quantities are di¢ cult to disentangle from the "net" estimates in reduced form. We are also interested in quantifying how much of the dislocation in external capital markets is ameliorated by reallocation in internal capital markets. This is di¢ cult to study in reduced form because the crisis data are frequently subject to other shocks, such as declining productivity and government intervention. The structural model allows us to separately identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation decision. We can then conduct counterfactuals in which …rms are exposed only to shocks in external capital markets and study how capital reallocates within …rms.
The structural model we use is a variant of an investment model with costly external …nancing such as Whited [2006] , with three novel features. First, a …rm comprises several divisions, which di¤er in productivity. The …nancing and investment decisions, however, are taken at the headquarters level, which is optimizing across all divisions. Second, the manager of the conglomerate has preferences for corporate socialism, where the headquarters gain some utility from minimizing the diversity in pro…ts among divisions. Our motivation follows directly from the work of Rajan, Servaes and Zingales [2000] and Scharfstein and Stein [2000] who present models that micro-found managerial socialism. Third, we allow the cost of accessing external capital markets to be time varying. These three features capture the dynamic tradeo¤ posited earlier. The structural model uses investment, …nancing and cash stock decisions taken within the diversi…ed …rm to estimate the parameters of corporate socialism and time varying cost of external …nancing.
We use the two step estimator developed in Bajari, Benkard and Levin [2007] (BBL) to estimate the parameters of our problem. A major source of identi…cation in our model is the division investment response to its own productivity and the productivity of other divisions. If productivity is mis-measured in a systematic way our estimates will be biased (see Gomes [2001] , Whited [2001] , Chevalier [2004] , Villalonga [2004] and Gomes and Livdan [2004] ). In Section V.C.2 we discuss the criteria that the measurement error would have to satisfy in order to generate our results, and argue that such measurement error is highly implausible. Nevertheless, we account for potential bias in measured productivity using an oil price based shifter of dispersion in productivity across divisions of a conglomerate. Intuitively, we exploit variation in industry productivity driven by oil prices which generates an instrument for productivity dispersion among divisions. Since divisions comprising conglomerates are exposed to oil prices in di¤erent ways, a change in oil prices will di¤erentially change divisions'productivity, changing the productivity dispersion in a conglomerate exogenously. It is this variation that identi…es the parameters of our model.
A central result from our structural model is an estimate of preferences for corporate socialism, which allows us to quantify the frictions in internal capital markets. This uniquely di¤erentiates our paper from the existing literature on conglomerates. Our estimate of "dark" side of conglomerates is economically large and suggests signi…cant corporate socialism inside diversi…ed …rms. Managers allocate too little capital to the strong division: an average two division conglomerate behaves as though the stronger division's productivity is 9 percentage points lower than it actually is.
Conversely, managers allocate too much capital to the weaker division, treating it as though it is 12 percentage points more productive than it really is. This tilt is even larger in conglomerates with more dispersed productivity among its divisions. In absence of external capital market frictions, these estimates reveal the large advantage of stand-alone …rms over conglomerates.
Our estimates of the 'bright' side of internal capital markets are driven by the ability to reallocate resources between divisions without incurring the cost of raising funds in external capital markets. For example, the estimates suggest that conglomerates on average face lower cost of …nancing due to "winner picking" as in Stein [2003] . In extreme cases this can reduce the cost of borrowing for the diversi…ed …rm by a signi…cant amount (about 6.8 percent in absolute terms).
This average cost conceals an important fact that there is substantial variation in the cost of external …nancing over time. We …nd a strong non-linearity in the e¤ect of time varying external capital market conditions suggesting a larger impact when there are episodes of extreme …nancial market dislocation. There is little change in accessing external capital markets for values of the TED spread, our proxy for external market dislocation, below 1 percent. 3 However, as TED increases to 1.5 percent the …nancing cost increases by almost 50 percent and is over 250 percent higher at TED of 2 percent. During these times of extreme …nancial market stress the ability to reallocate resources between divisions is valuable and potentially allows diversi…ed …rms to mediate the e¤ect of …nancial shocks.
We next explore how shocks to the …nancial sector are mediated by resource allocation inside diversi…ed …rms using our estimated model. We use the recent …nancial crisis of 2007/2008 to simulate the disruption in the supply of …nancial capital and study how these shocks are propagated di¤erentially through stand-alones and conglomerates. This allows us to examine the consequences of the credit shock on …rm value and how this change in value is related to the allocation of resources within …rms.
We start with our model, which is estimated on the period from 1980 to 2006, and expose the …rms in the sample to capital market conditions from 2007 to 2010. We forward simulate, assuming that the only change from the pre-crisis period was an increase in the cost of accessing external capital markets re ‡ected in an increase in the TED spread. Using this simulated data, we …nd that the di¤erence in value of conglomerates relative to a comparable portfolio of stand-alone …rms decreases as TED spikes in 2008, but increases when TED drops in 2009 and 2010. In other words, as external market conditions tighten, conglomerates become more valuable relative to stand-alone …rms and as the …nancial markets normalize, the pattern reverses.
We also show that the source of this increase in relative value of conglomerates is the ability to reallocate resources between their divisions. In particular, we …nd that in non-crisis periods investment of conglomerate …rms is less sensitive to productivity than that of stand-alone …rms.
However, as TED increases in 2008, this wedge decreases: conglomerates are able to shift more internal funds among divisions, but stand-alone …rms are precluded from raising …nancing from the market.
Remarkably, even though this data is simulated out of sample and ignores any e¤ect of the crisis on productivity or government intervention, we show that these patterns are consistent with those found in actual data of diversi…ed …rms between 2007-2009. We …nd that factors other than increased frictions in external capital markets explain up to 30% of the change in relative valuation of conglomerates during this period. Examining reduced form conglomerate valuations would therefore signi…cantly overstate the extent to which capital reallocation within …rms mediates the e¤ect of …nancial shocks. The counterfactual exercise shows that an increase in …nancial markets stress during the crisis was ameliorated in diversi…ed …rms through more e¢ cient resource allocation by 16% to 30%.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. This paper is clearly related to prior studies that examine the costs and bene…ts of conglomeration. On theoretical front while Stein [1997] among others argues that active internal capital markets in diversi…ed …rms have bene…ts, several papers including Rajan 4 Gomes and Livdan [2004] study a quantitative model of conglomerates. They use their model to argue that the decision to become a conglomerate could explain the measured relationship between investment, valuation and Q between conglomerates and stand-alone …rms. Instead of looking at whether a …rm becomes a conglomerate, we take the structure of conglomerates as given. Our focus is how resource allocation decisions vary among conglomerates with di¤erences in productivity dispersion and how this relationship is related to external capital markets. Moreover, instead of a model with no agency frictions, our model explicitly allows for corporate socialism, which we estimate to be quantitatively large. Maksimovic and Phillips [2008] exploit demand shocks in the real sector to show that conglomerates alleviate …nancial constraints in acquisitions and plant openings in growth industries. Instead, our focus is in understanding how internal capital markets adjust to shocks in the …nancial sector and quantifying these e¤ects. In doing so, this paper is the …rst to decompose the costs and bene…ts of conglomerates and examines how the tradeo¤ between these forces changes with condition of external capital markets.
Our work is also related to structural models of credit market imperfections. Adams Finally, our paper is broadly related to literature that relates macroeconomic shocks to growth.
For instance, Bloom [2009] analyzes the e¤ect of uncertainty on changes in aggregate output. Our work relates the shocks in the …nancial sector to resource allocation inside …rms which can in turn shape the path of total factor productivity and growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data. In Section III we present some reduced form evidence that motivates our theory. Section IV presents the while Section V discusses the estimator. Section VI discuss our …ndings while Section VII presents counterfactuals based on the …nancial market destabilization in the 2007 and 2008 crisis. Section VIII concludes.
II Data and Variables
Our division-level data used in the estimation come from Compustat segment …les covering the (…nancial …rms) or 9 (government …rms); (iii) those with sales less than $10 million and (iv) those with data missing on either market value of equity or cash ‡ow statement items. Following Lang and Stulz [1994] , we also drop …rms if: (i) the sum of the division sales is not within 1% of the total net sales and if the sum of division assets is not within 25% of the …rm assets. For remaining …rms, a multiple is applied such that the sum of the recomputed division assets adds up to total assets; and (ii) the imputed value of the conglomerate is missing. Imputed value of the diversi…ed …rm is the sum of the division values, with each division valued using median sales and asset multipliers of stand-alone …rms in that industry. Imposing all the …lters described above, results in a sample of 203,708 diversi…ed division-years evenly spread out over the sample period. Table I provides descriptive statistics on sales, assets, cash ‡ow, capital expenditures, capital expenditures divided by assets, cash ‡ow divided by sales, and industry Q. We measure cash ‡ow as operating pro…ts plus depreciation. This measure of cash ‡ow is standard in the literature and does not adjust cash ‡ow for taxes, working capital investments, and other factors because that data is not available. We de…ne industry Q as the median Q of stand-alone …rms within the same three digit SIC as the division. In calculating stand-alone Q's, we follow the data de…nition in Kaplan and Zingales [1997] , where the book value of assets equals Compustat item 6, and the market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity (item 25 times item 199) less the book value of common equity (item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74).
As shown in Table I , stand-alone …rms are smaller than divisions of conglomerate …rms on the basis of both sales ($494 million vs. $756 million) and assets ($768 million vs. $1299 million). These di¤erences are statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level. Stand-alone …rms appear to operate in industries with better investment opportunities than those of conglomerate divisions; the mean industry Q of stand-alone …rms is 2.7 as compared to 1.6 for divisions inside a conglomerate. In addition, stand-alone …rms appear to be less pro…table than divisions of conglomerates as measured by the cash ‡ow to asset ratio (11.5% vs. 15.5%). These di¤erences are statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level.
We also report the excess value (EV) of the conglomerate as the log of the ratio of …rm value to its imputed value (Lang and Stulz [1994] ). The measure captures the di¤erence in Q of the conglomerate relative to a portfolio of stand-alone …rms -with the median stand-alone …rm operating in the same industry as the division of the conglomerate chosen as the comparison …rm.
In the sample, the mean excess value for diversi…ed …rms is -10.8%. 
, where w j is division j 's share of total assets, Q j is imputed Q , n is the number of divisions and wQ is the average asset weighted Q j . The second more simple measure used in the paper, Dispersion is de…ned as the standard deviation of division (imputed) market-to-book ratio, Q; within a conglomerate. As can be observed, on average the Diversity (Dispersion) has a mean value of 0:77 (0:42 ). The results are not sensitive to using Diversity instead. 5 A division's Q is imputed from the median Q of industry in which the division operates as in Lang and Stulz [1994] and Berger and Ofek [1995] .
III Motivating Facts: Reduced Form Evidence
In this section we provide results that speak directly to our hypothesis on the interaction of internal and external capital markets and provide facts that help us motivate the economic forces in our structural model.
III.A Excess Value, Dispersion in Divisional Productivity and External Financing Conditions
We begin by demonstrating that there is a relationship between dispersion in division productivity and …rm value. This results are indicative of the net cost and bene…t tradeo¤ of organizational structure: conglomerates exhibit a diversi…cation discount, and the discount is worse for conglomerates with dispersed investment opportunities. In Table II , we begin by regressing excess value, EV of a diversi…ed …rm on standard …rm observables. In particular, we estimate:
where Z includes other factors that have been used in the literature to explain the value of a diversi…ed …rm (Size, Leverage, (1) to (3) we use Diversity while in Columns (4) to (6) we use Dispersion and report the results in Table II. The estimate in Column (1) shows that diversi…ed …rms with more dispersed productivity among divisions tend to have lower value as compared to a portfolio of comparable stand-alone …rms of similar productivity. The result is robust to including …rm …xed e¤ects ( i ) and time ( t ) …xed e¤ects with standard errors clustered at the unit of year or …rm. The estimates are large in economic magnitudes. For instance in Column (1) a half SD increase in dispersion of division productivity in the diversi…ed …rm (about 0.38) is associated with a 6% increase in its EV -which is large relative to the mean EV for the whole conglomerate sample reported earlier. These results are similar to those reported in RSZ [2000] .
Next, we provide reduced form evidence consistent with our hypothesis that internal capital markets ameliorate external capital market dislocations. We allow for time varying cost of external …nancing by proxying the state of credit markets by the TED spread -the di¤erence between the interest rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government T-bills. It measures the di¤erence between an unsecured deposit rate and the rate on a government backed obligation. While the TED spread is a conventional proxy for intermediation risk (Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin [2008] ) we discuss its potential limitations and how these might a¤ect our results in Section V.C.2. In Column (2), we show that conglomerates with more dispersed productivity perform better relative to stand-alone …rms during times at which external capital markets are impaired and that this improvement is consistent with the patterns of resource allocation we observe. In particular, during times of tightening credit markets, EV increases more for conglomerates which have diverse division productivity (coe¢ cient on Dispersion*TED is positive in Column (2) 
The dependent variable
Capex
Assets is the asset-normalized capital spending of division i of a conglomerate (or stand-alone …rm) in year t . i are division …xed e¤ects and are included to address the possibility that time-invariant (perhaps technology-driven) di¤erences in investment levels among divisions may explain some of the variation. We include year …xed e¤ects ( t ) to deal with changing tax regimes and changing state of the business cycle during our sample period.
In Column (3) of Table II , we estimate the regression with both stand-alone …rms and diversi…ed divisions. As can be observed is positive suggesting that division investment is sensitive to productivity. However, < 0 , which suggests that the Q-sensitivity of diversi…ed …rms is lower than in stand-alone …rms. This fact has been interpreted by RSZ [2000] as evidence of socialist preferences of diversi…ed …rms. 6 Next, in Column (4), we …nd that capital expenditures in diversi…ed …rms become more sensitive to productivity relative to stand-alone …rms when external markets are tight -proxied by higher TED. These …ndings are related to several studies, which …nd di¤erences in behavior of standalone …rms and conglomerates as macroeconomic conditions change (eg., Dimitrov and Tice [2006] , Hovakimian [2011] and Hann, Ogneva and Ozbas [2011] ). These results suggests that the relative increase in value of diversi…ed …rms when markets are tight from Column (2) may be related to the ability of conglomerates to reallocate resources without the help of external capital markets.
To evaluate this more systematically, in Columns (5) and (6) we restrict the analysis to diversi…ed …rms and examine if the sensitivity of investment varies with the extent of dispersion in productivity among divisions. We estimate a speci…cation similar to the one above on only diversi…ed …rms with Dummy replaced by measures of dispersion of productivity within the diversi…ed …rm. As can be observed from Column (5), we …nd that even within diversi…ed …rms < 0 -indicating that division's investment is less sensitive to Q inside conglomerates with diverse productivity. Moreover, consistent with the coe¢ cient Dispersion*TED in Column (2), investment to Q sensitivity is also higher during high TED periods for conglomerates with more dispersed productivity among divisions (Column (3)).
We also use alternative measures of credit supply constraints such as Baa spread and the FED senior loan o¢ cer survey to evaluate the robustness of TED and …nd similar results (unreported for brevity). Overall, these results suggest that when the cost of external …nancing is high, the internal capital market becomes relatively more e¢ cient, especially in conglomerates with dispersed division productivity. The likely reason is that conglomerates can reallocate funds internally without the …rm having to incur the cost of raising external funds.
Of course, if Q is mis-measured in a systematic way, either because of issues of measuring productivity or endogenous conglomerate composition the estimates presented above will be biased as well. Further, TED, in addition to measuring variation in credit supply might also capture demand of conglomerates for funding. As discussed in Section V.C, the major sources of identi…cation in our structural model are closely related to reduced form evidence presented here. In that section we discuss why our identi…cation is not a¤ected by measurement error in either productivity or measures of external capital market frictions. Further, in the Appendix we obtain similar results as in Table II when we account for potential bias in measured productivity using an oil price based shifter of dispersion in productivity across divisions of the conglomerate.
This reduced form evidence allows us to track only the net bene…t or cost of resource allocation inside the …rm. However, our goal is to identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation and how these forces change as the external capital markets change. These quantities are di¢ cult to disentangle from the "net" estimates in reduced form. We are also interested in quantifying how much of the dislocation in external capital markets is ameliorated by reallocation in internal capital markets. This is di¢ cult to study in reduced form because the crisis data are frequently subject to other shocks, such as declining productivity and government intervention. As we discuss below, the structural model allows us to separately identify and quantify the forces driving the reallocation decision. We can then conduct counterfactuals in which …rms are exposed only to shocks in external capital markets and study how capital reallocates within …rms.
IV Theory Production and investment
We now model a …rm's investment and …nancing problem. A …rm has n 1 divisions. All investment occurs through divisions; i.e. no investment is done at headquarters. The divisions have no funds on their own; headquarters allocates funds to divisions for investment and collects any surplus funds divisions generate. This is a standard assumption in the conglomerates literature, see RSZ [2000] for example. Each division j has per period cash ‡ows at time t of k tj z tj ; where
is the pro…tability of that division at time t and k tj 2 0; k the assets of the division in that time period. The pro…tability of the division follows a Markov process with i.i.d pro…tability shock " z tj N (0; z jz t 1j ) .
Capital is irreversible, I tj 2 0; I but depreciates at rate . Capital evolution in division j is given by:
Investing has …xed and convex adjustment cost. The …xed costs of adjustment vary with division size and are parameterized as raising external …nancing f t ; which increases the cash stock in period t+1; and through generating or consuming funds in the previous period. Let t be the pro…ts of the …rm in period t; then the …rm's cash stock evolves according to:
Raising external …nancing f t the …rm incurs both …xed and variable cost, and each component is time varying. This is in line with the literature that …nds these costs vary with …nancial market conditions. The …nancial market conditions are described by a state variable t 2 0; which captures the perceived credit supply constraints in the general economy, TED. TED follows a Markov process, with i.i.d. shocks " t N 0; j t 1 :
The …xed and variable cost of external …nancing can also be decreasing in the combined assets of the …rm P j k tj , suggesting that larger …rms may be able to borrow more cheaply, potentially by using assets to obtain collateralized …nancing (e.g., Hart and Moore [1995] ). We parameterize the …xed cost of raising f t dollars of external …nancing for the …rm by
and variable cost of …nancing by I ft>0 f t c 4 + c 5 t + c 6 2
where the quadratic term
accommodates the fact that cost of external …nancing can increase non-linearly. We also allow for quadratic cost of external …nancing c 8 f 2 t I ft>0 : Instead of raising external …nancing the …rm can …nance projects from its cash stock. We ensure that the manager has incentives not to hoard too much cash in the …rm by imposing a constant marginal cost of holding cash for the …rm. We are agnostic about the source of the cost. For instance, one motivation of imposing this cost could be agency related since the manager is likely to spend some of the resources on ine¢ cient perks (eg, Eisfeldt and Rampini [2008] headquarters from socialist behavior as being proportional to diversity in pro…ts among divisions.
The manager values gross pro…ts from division j at z tj k tj (z tj z t ) k tj ; where z t is the average productivity of the divisions in the …rm and z t = 1 n P n j=1 z tj : This captures the fact that the manager undervalues pro…ts from divisions that are more productive than the average division and overvalues pro…ts from divisions that are less productive than the average division. An alternative way of expressing manager's preferences is to express the trade-o¤ between gross pro…ts and socialism as k tj ((1 ) z tj + z t ) . In other words, the manager values division cash ‡ows as though the productivity of a division is a weighted average of the productivity of the division and the average division within the …rm.
The managerial per period utility function can then be written as …rm's cash ‡ows t minus the dis-utility arising from corporate socialism,
We collect the terms in this equation and write the manager's per period utility function more explicitly as:
It is useful to summarize our model in the following way. the …rm a t = (s t ) and " t the vector of shocks " t = h " z t1 ; :::; " z tn ; "
The manager then solves:
where the expectation is taken over current and future values of shocks to pro…tability and external …nancing.
It is worth noting that we choose external …nancing as a control in our approach, and not the future cash stock as is common in the literature (Whited [2006] ). This is without loss of generality but results in a pro…t function linear in parameters, which greatly speeds up our estimation procedure. [2003] . The bright side of internal capital markets -comprising all these e¤ects -is governed by parameters on cost of external …nancing and parameters that govern the agency cost of holding cash in the …rm -with the e¤ect larger when external markets are tight.
The dark side of internal capital markets is captured by manager's preference for corporate socialism, parameterized by . Keeping external …nancing …xed, diversi…ed …rms allocate capital less e¢ ciently than stand-alone …rms due to socialist considerations. In particular, conditional on the amount of investment the …rm is making, the manager is willing to tilt more investment towards weaker divisions.
Our model provides insights on how the bright and dark side of internal capital markets inside of a diversi…ed …rm evolve with changes in external capital markets. While corporate socialism may decrease e¢ ciency of diversi…ed …rms relative to stand-alone …rms when credit markets are loose, tighter external credit markets will tend to increase the bright side of internal capital markets.
In fact, when raising external …nancing for stand-alone …rms is very costly, diversi…ed …rms may allocate capital more e¢ ciently than stand-alone …rms. This suggests that the relative e¢ ciency of capital allocation in conglomerates versus stand-alone …rms is time varying and depends on the extent of frictions in external …nancing and how these frictions interact with socialist motives inside of diversi…ed …rms. In Section V.C we discuss the sources of variation in the data that allow us to estimate the model and separate these forces.
V Estimation
In this section we describe the estimator that allows us to obtain the parameters of the model presented in the previous section. We use the two step estimator developed in Bajari et al [2007] . 8 Because of the large action space of our …rm, computing the value function is expensive, and nesting such an computation in an estimator even more so. This precludes us from applying estimators that have been commonly used to estimate investment problems (e.g., Hennessy and Whited [2007] ). As we will argue, using the Bajari et al [2007] estimator also provides a tight link to the reduced form results and allows us to incorporate our instrument for division productivity in a natural way.
The intuition of the Bajari et al [2007] estimator in our problem is the following. The …rst stage of the estimation is closely related to the reduced form estimation from Section III. We use ‡exible reduced form regressions to estimate the investment and …nancing choices …rms make given their characteristics. In other words, we estimate the …rms' policy function. We also estimate the expected evolution of productivity and the TED spread (our state variable for credit supply constraints) i.e., the state transition function. In the second stage of the estimation we use those estimates to simulate …rms' expected actions (investment and external …nancing) and expected characteristics (capital, amount of cash). For a given set of parameters, the model presented in the previous section translates …rms'expected actions into managers'expected utility.
The estimator then uses the insight that managers'make choices that maximize their expected utility. In other words, were they to make alternative choices, their utility would be weakly lower. To implement this insight we create alternative policy functions, i.e. …rms choose di¤erent investment and external …nancing than they do in the data. We then simulate …rms' expected actions and expected characteristics and again use the model (for a given set of parameters) to translate these into expected utility. We choose the set of parameters that assign the highest expected utility to the choices that are actually taken by the …rms in the data. These parameters are our estimates.
V.A First Stage V.A.1 Assumptions
In order to be able to recover the policy function from the data using our speci…cations, Bajari et al [2007] show that two assumptions need to be satis…ed:
Assumption MC:
where u t is our per period managerial utility function. This assumption is trivially satis…ed.
Assumption S1: The assumption in our speci…cations below is that they are rich enough to approximate the true policy function in the data. We mostly use second degree polynomials.
V.A.2 Policy Function
We start our estimation by recovering our policy function from the data. In other words, we are interested in how …rms' state variables, the capital of each division, its productivity, …rms' cash stock and the TED spread map into its choices. To recover our policy function we use second degree polynomials to approximate the policy functions. Since we assume investment is irreversible, it cannot be negative. We incorporate that by estimating a tobit for investment. Speci…cally, we estimate the following speci…cations:
I tj = max 0; Q 2 k t; z t ; t; p t ; I + " I tj (5)
where Q 2 (; ) represents a second degree polynomial and the vector of coe¢ cients.
V.A.3 State Transition Function
Next, we have to recover our state transition function from the data. The state transition function maps the state variables and choice variables in period t to state variables in period t + 1; s t+1 = P (s t ; " t ; a t ) : We are interested in how …rms' state variables, the capital of each division, its productivity, …rms'cash stock and the TED spread map together with …rms'choice of investment and external …nance into …rms'state variables next year. In contrast to the policy function, we can use theory to guide the shape of our state transition functions. First, we can use the law of motion for capital: capital in the next period is capital from the previous period, minus depreciation, plus investment, so we estimate the rate of capital depreciation from the data using a linear regression
The evolution of division's productivity z tj is governed by a Markov process, in which a division's productivity depends only on its productivity in the previous period. We approximate the evolution of division productivity with linear splines, where G i () is a linear spline with 9 knots at the deciles of the productivity distribution.
Similarly, the evolution of the TED spread is also a Markov process and is independent of …rm speci…c variables:
We then recover the state transition function for the …rm cash policy. Because the cash stock of a …rm cannot be negative, we approximate it with a tobit p t+1 = max 0; Q 2 k t ; z t ; t ; p t ; I t ; f t ; p + " p tj
We also use speci…cations (8) and (9) to recover the dispersion of the pro…t shocks (" z ) and the dispersion of the shocks to the TED (" z ) from the estimated residuals.
V.A.4 Bias in productivity measurement 9
As we discuss later in Section V.C, a major source of identi…cation in our model is the division investment response to its own productivity and the productivity of other divisions and how it relates to variation in the TED spread. If productivity is mis-measured in a systematic way, either because of issues of measuring productivity or endogenous conglomerate composition, our estimates will be biased as well. We account for potential bias in measured productivity using an oil price based shifter of dispersion in productivity across divisions of the conglomerate. Intuitively, we exploit variation in industry productivity driven by oil prices which generates an instrument for productivity dispersion among divisions. Since divisions comprising conglomerates are exposed to oil prices in di¤erent ways, a change in oil prices will di¤erentially change divisions'productivity, changing the productivity dispersion in a conglomerate exogenously.
The procedure entails two steps: …rst, to obtain industry productivity driven by oil prices we regress two digit SIC industry median productivity on oil prices (real oil price per barrel in USD) over our sample period. We then calculate the movements in median industry productivity driven by oil prices. Formally, we …rst project the median productivity of a division's industry in a given year on oil price in that year to obtain the sensitivity of industry productivity on oil price.
Speci…cally, let K index an industry z tK be the productivity of the median …rm in the industry and x t the oil price at time t . The regression we estimate is:
This yields an estimate of industry median productivity variation driven by oil prices, c oil Kt = K +^ K x t . In order to only exploit this variation in …rm productivity, we then estimate the policy and state transition functions using the instrumental variables control function approach with c oil Kt as our instrument. In particular, we obtain a division level control function as a residual from the regression of the measured productivity of the division j , z tj on the industry median productivity variation driven by oil c oil jt :
We include these division level residuals as additional regressors in the policy function and transition function to control for systematic biases in measured productivity. As an additional check for 9 We would like to thank Lars Hansen for helpful discussions on how to implement the instrument.
validity of our instrument, we replicate the reduced form regressions discussed in Section III. The results, reported and discussed in the Appendix, suggest that the instrument is valid.
V.B Second Stage
In the second stage we estimate our parameter vector = [1; ; 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; c 0 ; :::; c 8; j 0 ; j 1 ] 0 : We can write the value of the …rm pursuing a strategy n at state s at time i as V t (s; n ; ) : Following
; I ft>0 t ; I ft>0
Because our utility function is linear in parameters, we can write the value function of pursuing policy n at state s at time i :
Imposing the optimallity condition, we know that for every alternative policy at the true value of the parameter :
where is the true policy function of the …rm. Write a pro…table deviation of optimal policy as
Bajari et al [2007] then exploit the fact that at the true value of the parameter vector, the true policy function maximizes the expected utility at every state. Intuitively, to obtain our parameter value we choose a parameter that minimizes square pro…table deviations from the true policy function. We write the moment condition as
where H 1 is a distribution of possible states and H 2 a distribution of alternative policies.
To obtain the sample counterpart of the moment condition, we generate alternative policies and expected payo¤s from these policies. We perturb the policy functions with additive perturbations drawn from the empirical distribution of errors^ (" I ) and^ (" f ) obtained from estimating policy functions as speci…ed in (5) and (6) . We perturb only one dimension of our policy function at any instant and do so for 50 alternative policies for each dimension of our policy function. For example, consider a two division …rm with estimated policy functions:
I t1 = max 0; Q 2 k t; z t ; t; p t ;^ I I t2 = max 0; Q 2 k t; z t ; t; p t ;^ I f t = Q 2 k t; z t ; t; p t ;^ f :
We obtain the …rst 50 alternative policies by perturbing investment in division 1 by setting I k t1 = max 0; Q 2 k t; z t ; t; p t ;^ I + " k I ; we draw " k I from N~(0;^ (" I )) where k indexes the perturbed policy. Then we generate an additional 50 alternative policies by perturbing the estimated policy function for division 2. Last we generate 50 policies by perturbing the external …nancing policy 50 times, drawing perturbations from N~(0;^ (" f )) .
To compute the expected pro…ts for a policy at a certain state we forward simulate productivity shocks and shocks to TED for 100 periods (years) to obtain the evolution of state and choice variables. We draw these shocks from the empirical distribution of errors^ " z tj and^ " t obtained from state transition functions as speci…ed in (8) and (9) respectively. We set the discount rate = 0:95: The results are robust to di¤erent levels of . We draw 1000 paths from each observation in our data to compute the expected pro…ts for each observation. Drawing from data allows us to cover a wide space of potentially achievable states. We stop the forward simulation at 100 years and approximate the continuation value of a policy with the value of its capital at that point-the scraping value of the …rm .
Let n s be the number of observations in the data and n p is the number of alternative policies.
We obtain the estimate of our parameter vector by solving:
The parameter vector is identi…ed from the optimallity condition: the true policy function should have higher utility than any alternative policy function, but the amount of extra utility is not informative. Therefore, we obtain our estimate by minimizing the violations of optimallity condition. Because the optimallity condition is an inequality, it is possible that there could be several vectors of parameters that would satisfy all inequalities, thus identifying a set of parameters for the model. In our estimates that is not the case, so all our parameter estimates are singletons.
Because our utility function is linear in parameters, we only need to forward simulate once to obtain expected utility for all policies for any set of parameters.
Linearity of parameters also allows us to search for a global minimum-we initialize our minimization procedure from 500 di¤erent starting points. We obtain our standard errors using a non-parametric bootstrap of . We draw 250 random sub-samples (with replacement); each subsample is the size of the original data that we use in our simulation (for each of these points, we compute all alternative policy functions). As in Bajari et al [2010] and Ryan [2010] these standard errors do not take into account that the policy function and state transition function are themselves estimates, and that we compute our expectations with a …nite number of simulated paths. As a result, our standard errors will be slightly biased downwards.
V.C Identi…cation V.C.1 Sources of variation
Before we proceed to the results from our model it is useful to think about which features in the data identify the parameters in the model, given the exogenous (instrumented) productivity shocks and external capital conditions. The identi…cation in the structural model is closely related to the reduced form estimation from Section III. In the reduced form model, a "too low"responsiveness of investment to productivity is a sign of miss-allocation. The model uses all coe¢ cients from the …rst stage regressions simultaneously and interprets "too low" in a quantitative sense using an explicit production model and expected utility maximization by the manager. While the model is quite complex, and forces are identi…ed jointly, it is useful to provide some basic tradeo¤s and how they would a¤ect the data.
A large source of identi…cation is the sensitivity of division investment to its own productivity and the productivity of other divisions. In a frictionless world, the allocation of capital would be such that the marginal productivity of investment would equal its marginal cost (absent …xed cost). There are two main sources of frictions in our model which will incorporate the productivity of one division in the investment decision of the other division. The …rst is corporate socialism. If corporate socialism is high, the investment of a division will be higher if other divisions are more productive. In particular, if a division is more productive than the mean productivity across all divisions in a …rm, it will invest more than it otherwise would, and vice versa. The instrument allows us to separate this variation from productivity mis-measurement.
The second friction is the cost of raising external capital, which increases the shadow cost of investing. In contrast to corporate socialism, cost of raising external capital induces investment in a division to decrease in the productivity of other divisions. E¤ectively, productivity of other divisions raises the opportunity cost of investing. To see the intuition, consider the situation in which a …rm is not able to raise any outside …nancing. With no corporate socialism the optimal investment equates the marginal return to investing in both divisions. If we can pin down the cost of external …nancing, dispersion in productivity across divisions in a …rm would identify the parameter of corporate socialism.
Several features in the data help us pin down cost of external …nancing and cost of holding cash, which are interdependent. The …rst is the response of investment to the level of productivity.
Cost of external …nancing introduces a wedge between the cost of capital implied by our production model and the cost of capital faced by the …rm; the higher the cost, the larger the wedge. The second is the responsiveness of external …nancing to productivity. Were there no cost of external …nancing, the …rm would raise enough external …nancing to equate the marginal product of investment (given …xed cost and corporate socialism) to its marginal cost.
Similarly, the …rm would pay out all the surplus cash. With cost of external …nancing and cost of holding cash, the …rm does not raise enough …nancing and holds a stock of cash. First, obtaining external …nancing introduces cost. Further, the …rm needs to take into account the cost of holding cash. It uses the stock of cash to protect itself from incurring cost of external …nancing in the future, but holding cash is costly. Therefore if the …rm raises too much cash, it will have to pay the cost of holding it if it does not use it for investment right away. In other words, the higher the cost of holding cash, the lower is external …nancing that exceeds current investment needs.
Finally, to identify the time varying component of cost of external …nancing we exploit the exogenous variation in TED. The primary source of identi…cation is the correlation of external …nancing and TED. However, the cash and investment policies of the …rm are also informative, because they are a¤ected by the time variation in cost of external …nancing. Holding cash protects the …rm's ability to invest during temporary spikes in cost of external …nancing, so how the …rm's cash stock evolves with TED is also informative on this dimension. Investment also responds to spikes in external cost of …nancing, since the …rm trades o¤ investing now relative to investing in the future, when external …nance may be easier to access.
V.C.2 Measurement error
The major sources of identi…cation in our model are the division investment response to its own productivity, the division investment response to productivity dispersion among divisions of a conglomerate, and how these investment responses are related to variation in TED spreads. Both our baseline measure of productivity, Q, and our measure of credit supply constraints, TED, could be mis-measured in a systematic way, biasing our estimates. For instance, Q could be a poor measure of productivity. Further, dispersion in Q could be biased because of conglomerate composition.
Finally, TED, in addition to measuring variation in credit supply might also capture demand of conglomerates for funding. We now discuss the criteria that the measurement error would have to satisfy in order to generate our results, and argue that such measurement error is highly implausible.
We …rst construct an alternative measure of productivity to assess the robustness of our estimates to measurement error. As explained below, the alternative measure, return on assets (ROA), is in fact a natural empirical counterpart to our productivity variable. Even though our …ndings are similar using either productivity measure, we use Q as our primary variable. This allows us to tightly map our …ndings to the large empirical literature on internal capital markets that also uses Q as a proxy for productivity. Similarly, we use alternative measures of credit supply constraints such as Baa spread and the FED senior loan o¢ cer survey to evaluate the robustness of TED. Of course, simply using alternative productivity and credit supply measures is not a panacea to all measurement problems.
While there may be several types of measurement error, the error which may a¤ect our estimation has to be of a speci…c type. Our model predicts that high productivity divisions have lower investment in conglomerates with more dispersed productivity. Further, during times of high TED, this e¤ect of dispersion on investments is smaller. Therefore, for measurement error to generate results in line with our model, the productivity of high productivity divisions has to be systematically upward biased, this bias has to be larger in conglomerates with more dispersed productivity.
Further, this measurement error has to increase during times of high TED. The converse should also be true for low productivity divisions.
The same reasoning also suggests that the variation in TED that identi…es our model does not proxy for aggregate credit demand. Our model predicts that if TED measures credit supply, then the investment sensitivity to productivity of high productivity divisions should increase, and more so in conglomerates with more dispersed division productivity. The converse would be true for low productivity divisions. If high TED proxies for low aggregate credit demand it is hard to see how an increase in TED would induce type of heterogeneous investment response that is predicted by our model. Nevertheless, we also address the potential measurement error concerns in two additional ways. First, we account for potential bias in measured productivity using an oil price based shifter of dispersion in productivity across divisions of the conglomerate. Since divisions comprising conglomerates are in di¤erent industries, a change in oil prices will di¤erentially change divisions' productivity, changing the productivity dispersion in a conglomerate exogenously. If an increase in oil price increases the productivity dispersion among divisions based on their industry, then our model predicts that high productivity divisions decrease their sensitivity of investment to productivity. On the other hand, if an increase in oil prices decreases the productivity dispersion among divisions based on their industry, then our model predicts that high productivity divisions increase the sensitivity of investment to productivity. In other words, for measurement error in productivity to drive our results, once we incorporate the instrument, one would have to believe that an increase in oil prices drives measurement error exactly in the way our model predicts. Also note that the investment response to an oil price increase can be positive or negative, depending on the composition of the conglomerate. Therefore it is hard to generate the results from our model if oil prices simply proxy for aggregate movements in either demand or supply.
Second, in our counterfactual exercise, we take the estimates from our model during the precrisis period (up to 2006) and simulate …rm behavior in the crisis period (2007-2010). 10 Even though this was a very tumultuous period unlike any we have seen since the Great Depression, we …nd that the patterns in the actual data during the crisis are remarkably similar to the simulated data from our model. Again, it is hard to see how our model would predict …rm behavior out of sample in the crisis, if the estimates were driven by some measurement error. For example, it is hard to see how TED shocks cause heterogenous responses between di¤erent types of conglomerates (in the exact direction predicted by the model) if they proxy for aggregate credit demand.
Taken together these arguments paint a consistent picture. The argument that potential sources of measurement error are generating our estimates faces a very high hurdle. It has to generate very speci…c patterns in the data along several dimensions.
VI Empirical Results
In this section we present the results from estimating our model presented in Section IV. We restrict our attention to conglomerates with two or three divisions, which cover 90 percent of diversi…ed …rms in our sample. We do not have enough data on conglomerates with more than three divisions to estimate the policy functions with enough precision. Most of our parameters are estimated statistically signi…cantly at 1 percent.
VI.A Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets
The dark side of internal capital markets in our model arises because of managerial preferences for corporate socialism. Estimating these preferences is the most novel contribution of this paper-while there are other estimates of frictions in external capital markets (Hennessy and Whited [2007] ), this is the …rst paper that provides structural estimates of the distortions in capital allocation between divisions in a …rm. This estimate allow us to quantify the cost of internal capital markets.
Our estimates using Q as a measure of productivity are presented in Panel A of Table III . The estimate of corporate socialism parameter is 0:76 , and is estimated statistically signi…cantly.
As is predicted by the theory (eg. RSZ [2000] ), the parameter estimate falls between 0 and 1 , suggesting that managers care about equality among divisions' cash- ‡ows, holding all else equal.
Note that since we do not constrain to be positive, we could have estimated a negative which would imply that managers prefer excess Darwinism by placing too much weight on divisions with strong cash- ‡ows.
To illustrate the magnitude of ; consider a back of the envelope calculation: suppose the …rm has two divisions, and division 1 is times as productive as division 2, i.e. z 1 = z 2 ; > 1 . The manager values a dollar of revenues produced by a unit of capital of a division at
In other words, the manager behaves as though she is maximizing the value of the …rm under the belief that the productivity of the division is a weighted average of division productivity and average division productivity, (1 ) z ij + z : Therefore, she values the dollar produced at the more productive division at less than a dollar, at 1 : The average ratio of productivity for two division …rms in our sample is 1:32 . At this dispersion and our estimate of ; the manager values revenues of the stronger division at 0:91 and the revenues of the weaker division at 1:12:
Corporate socialism is worse for conglomerates that have more diverse productivity di¤erences between divisions. To see this more clearly, consider a conglomerate whose productivity ratio is a standard deviations above the mean at 1:82: the manager values the revenues from the stronger division at 0:83 and the less productive division at 1:30 . Therefore we show that the manager is willing to tilt more investment towards a weak division, and the tilt can be signi…cant in conglomerates with very dispersed productivity. Overall, we estimate signi…cant costs associated with internal capital markets. In absence of external capital market frictions these estimates reveal the large advantage of stand-alone …rms over conglomerates.
VI.B Bright Side of Internal Capital Markets
The bright side of internal capital markets in our model arises because of frictions in external capital markets. As discussed before in Section IV, the bright side of internal capital markets is governed by parameters on cost of external …nancing and parameters that govern the cost of holding cash in the …rm. We are interested in the average cost of …nancing, how this cost changes with our measure of external market conditions, the TED spread, and in 'winner picking.'
Average cost of …nancing Since our cost of …nancing vary with TED, we …rst evaluate the cost of …nancing at the average TED spread in our sample of 0:44 percent. Our estimates imply a …xed cost of …nancing of 2:4 $mm. This yields mean …xed cost of 3 percent, slightly smaller than the …ndings of Hennessy and Whited [2007] for large …rms. We also …nd marginal cost of 12 percent, evaluated at the median size of a two division …rm. These estimates are slightly larger than those found in Hennessy and 
' Winner picking'
Conglomerates have an advantage over stand-alone …rms because they can use one division as collateral for …nancing investment in an alternative division of the same …rm. Stand-alone …rms, on the other hand, cannot collateralize a separate stand-alone …rm in order to raise more investment.
This e¤ect is akin to Stein [1997] 'winner picking'and is parameterized by (c 3 + c 7 f t )
To illustrate the magnitude of this bene…t consider the following example in the spirit of Stein [1997] and Stein [2003] . Suppose a conglomerate has two divisions, only one of which has an investment opportunity. Suppose, also, that the conglomerate has median assets for two division conglomerates in our sample of 70 $mm, or 35 $mm per division. The conglomerate wants to raise external …nancing to …nance the pro…table investment opportunity at the median amount in our sample of 14 $mm. We compare this conglomerate to two independent …rms, which have the same productivity and assets as the individual divisions of the conglomerate. However, only the more productive …rm wants to raise …nancing, since it is the only one with a good investment opportunity.
The example, while admittedly quite stark, allows us to see the 'winner picking' e¤ect very clearly. In particular, the winner picking advantage is computed as the di¤erence between the …nancing cost of the conglomerate and the stand-alone. Evaluated at the quantities described above, the advantage of the conglomerate is 
Cost of holding cash
Our model imposes a constant marginal cost of holding cash for the …rm. We are agnostic about the source of the cost; it can be agency related or tax driven, as in Riddick and Whited [2009] . The costs of holding cash is a modeling device that gives managers the incentive to pay-out funds to suppliers of capital and prevents the …rm from hoarding cash. In other words, it allows the model to rationalize the observed pay-out of capital.
Nevertheless, the magnitude is relevant, since it is related to the shadow cost of cash holdings, one of the main determinants of the bright side of internal capital markets. The costlier it is to hold cash, the more valuable is the role of internal capital markets, which can shift capital between investment opportunities and conserve on holding a large stock of costly cash. Our estimates suggest that the marginal cost of holding cash is approximately 30 percent. This magnitude rationalizes the fact that conglomerates frequently pay dividends and conduct share repurchases.
VI.C E¤ect of time varying credit market conditions
In our model we allow for time varying cost of external …nancing, where the variation is driven by changes in the TED spread: as the TED spread increases, so does the cost of accessing the external capital market.
To illustrate how external …nancing costs change with the TED spread, we use the estimates from Panel A of Table III What do these numbers mean? These calculations imply a large shadow value of internal funds. In other words, having internal funds at disposal has more value when external markets are dislocated. Since the internal funds can be shifted in internal capital markets relatively more e¢ ciently relative to non-integrated …rms, these results also suggest that the relative e¢ ciency of di¤erent organizational forms is time varying. Alternatively put, since the dark and bright sides of internal capital markets are measured relative to stand-alone …rms, these results show that the conglomerate cost/bene…t trade-o¤ is not constant over time but is rather a function of state of the external capital markets.
In Section VII, we present an alternative way of evaluating the impact of time varying credit market conditions on allocation of resources inside the …rm. We do so by examining a counterfactual scenario in which we expose …rms to external market stress as measured by TED spread spike during the credit market freeze of 2007/2008. In this scenario we study the change in investment behavior of divisions in a diversi…ed …rm relative to a stand-alone …rm. The responses of the …rm based on our estimates are then compared to the actual data to evaluate the …t of our model.
VI.D Estimates with an alternative measure of productivity
As discussed earlier, we have so far focused on using Q as a measure of productivity since it allowed us to compare our estimates to those from the literature. We now conduct additional tests with an alternative measure of productivity, the return on assets (ROA ), to assess the robustness of our estimates. In fact, ROA is a natural empirical counterpart to our productivity variable z ij .
We compute the ROA of a division in a year as the cash ‡ows of the division in that year divided by its capital. We obtain cash ‡ows of a division as the sum of the operating cash ‡ow and the reported accounting depreciation in the year. In the model, a division produces z ij k ij cash ‡ows and has assets of k ij ; so ROA
The results follow a strikingly close pattern as those presented in Panel B of Table III 
VII Do …rm boundaries mediate …nancial sector shocks?
We next explore how shocks to the …nancial sector are mediated by resource allocation inside diversi…ed …rms using our estimated model. We use the recent …nancial crisis of 2007/2008 to simulate the disruption in the supply of …nancial capital and study how shocks to the supply of capital are propagated di¤erentially through stand-alones and conglomerates. This allows us to examine the consequences of the credit shock on …rm value and how this change in value is related to the allocation of resources within …rms. Table IV we present regressions with simulated data. We …rst examine the impact of TED shocks on the value of conglomerates relative to stand alone …rms, measured by excess value (EV). We use data based on the forward simulation and de…ne EV as before. In particular, EV is de…ned as the log of the ratio of …rm value 11 of a conglomerate computed relative to the value of a portfolio of stand-alone …rms -with the median stand-alone …rm operating in the same industry as the division of the conglomerate chosen as the comparison …rm. In Column (1),
VII.A Analysis using simulated data
we restrict ourselves to three years around the TED shock. This allows us to make comparisons with actual data, which is only available from 2007 to 2009. As can be observed, during these years the relationship between EV and dispersion in productivity is positive. This result is related to the evidence presented earlier (Table II) where the relationship between EV and Dispersion becomes less negative during periods of tightened credit markets.
In Figure 2 (a) we present the evolution of the diversi…cation discount in our simulations over Table IV as well. The relationship between EV and dispersion in division productivity, which was positive in years around the TED shock (Column 1), changes signs in periods after the TED shock (Column 6).
Next, we explore the source of this increase in relative e¢ ciency of conglomerates. These …rms, while subject to corporate socialism, are able to direct resources between divisions, while standalone …rms are unable to utilize the external capital market to the same e¤ect. In Column (2), we con…rm that this relative value increase of diversi…ed …rms is related to the ability of conglomerates to reallocate resources without the help of external capital markets. In particular, we …nd that capital expenditures in diversi…ed …rms become more sensitive to productivity relative to standalone …rms. In the next three columns we report the relationship between capital expenditures and productivity for diversi…ed …rms only. Column (3) uses data on all the diversi…ed …rms in the sample. Columns (4) and (5) The results show that sensitivity of capital expenditures to productivity is higher for conglomerates with more diverse division productivity. 12 We show the same pattern in Figure 2 (b): as TED increases in 2008, conglomerates are able to invest more in high productivity divisions relative to comparable stand-alone …rms. Conversely, Figure 2 (c) shows that investment in low productivity divisions in a conglomerate falls in relative 1 1 We compute …rm value as the expected present value of cash- ‡ows of the …rm across simulated paths. In particular, we do not include managerial dis-utility in the calculation of value. 1 2 In unreported tests we …nd that this increase in investment to Q sensitivity of conglomerates with diverse investment opportunities is largely driven by divisions with above average investment opportunities. Using this data we …nd that the di¤erence in value of the conglomerate relative to a comparable portfolio of stand-alone …rms decreases as the crisis intensi…ed (coe¢ cient Dummy Y ear=08or09 in
Column (1)). Moreover, the relationship between the excess value of conglomerates and dispersion in division productivity is positive during the crisis period relative to the period before it.
In addition, this relative increase in the value of diversi…ed …rms is related to the ability of conglomerates to reallocate resources without the help of external capital markets: capital expenditures in diversi…ed …rms become more sensitive to productivity relative to stand-alone …rms (Column (2)); further, conglomerates with more diverse division productivity have a higher sensitivity of capital expenditures to productivity (Columns (3) to (5)). In other words, as external market conditions tighten, conglomerates became more e¢ cient relative to stand-alone …rms. These patterns are also consistent with those found in Kuppuswamy and Villalonga [2010] who use data from 2007 to 2009 and …nd a decrease in the diversi…cation discount at the beginning of the crisis.
VII.C Discussion
While the counterfactual makes a stark assumption -the crisis was driven solely through an increase in the cost of accessing external capital markets with …rm productivity and investment opportunities staying at pre-crisis levels -the …ndings are nevertheless informative on several fronts.
First, as mentioned earlier, the patterns generated by the out of sample simulation are remarkably consistent with the actual data. Second, these …ndings again reiterate that corporate socialism in diversi…ed …rms may not be static -it tends to attenuate when the external credit market is tight.
Finally, these …ndings suggest that an increase in the stress in the …nancial markets could be ameliorated by diversi…ed …rms through more e¢ cient resource allocation. The relative value of an average diversi…ed …rm improves from around -21% to -17.5% in the …rst year after the …nancial market dislocation. This amounts to a 16% change in relative valuation. This e¤ect is magni…ed for diversi…ed …rms with more dispersed division productivity. The e¤ect increases to 30% if we consider …rms in the top quartile based on the dispersion of productivity between divisions.
Of course, the recent …nancial crisis was not solely driven by a …nancial market freeze. The crisis was accompanied by real changes in productivity and large government interventions. Our model allows us to separate the pure e¤ect of the …nancial market channel on reallocation decisions from other contemporaneous e¤ects by comparing the quantitative results from our simulations to the actual data. Our model predicts a smaller increase in EV than was actually realized. It suggests that of the 5 percentage point increase in the excess value of conglomerates, 13 3.5 percentage points (Figure 2(a) ) are due to …nancial market conditions. Examining reduced form conglomerate valuations would therefore overstate the extent to which capital reallocation within …rms mediates the e¤ect of …nancial shocks by up to 30%. Moreover, our simulation suggests that if the crisis were a pure …nancial phenomenon, with no changes in productivity, …rms would have a higher investment to Q sensitivity than they actually did during the crisis. This suggests that expectations about productivity during the crisis did not stay unchanged, as our simulation assumes, but had decreased from their 2007 levels, which is consistent with evidence in Kahle and Stulz [2010] .
VIII Conclusion
We show that improved resource allocation within …rms' internal capital markets provides an important force countervailing …nancial market dislocation. We quantify the forces driving the reallocation decision by estimating a structural model of internal capital markets. This result has potentially important policy implications. Interventions aimed at de-clogging the banking systems during recessionary periods, such as during the great recession of 2008-2009, consider the potential e¤ects on output of …rms due to hampered credit. The …ndings in this paper suggest that unlike what has been assumed so far in the literature on the credit channel, some …rms reallocate resources internally to signi…cantly mediate the e¤ect of …nancial shocks. Therefore, these e¤ects may also be critical to understanding the consequences of policy interventions. This is especially important in light of the fact that diversi…ed …rms comprise large parts of economies around the world.
Our analysis is agnostic about the forces that shape corporate socialism in a …rm. It is reasonable to conjecture that bargaining between top management and outside investors could be driving part of this e¤ect akin to Scharfstein and Stein [2000] . In addition, it is likely that the bargaining of divisional managers with the headquarters might also be a¤ecting the extent of tilt in capital allocation by headquarters. Evaluating whether and how these forces shape the extent of socialism in a …rm is a fruitful area of future research.
More broadly, understanding how …rm boundaries mediate …nancial shocks could be useful in providing insights on macroeconomic movements. Existing literature suggests that distortions in resource allocation between …rms can have large e¤ects on aggregate TFP (e.g., Bloom [2009] ). In contrast, we study particular sources of distortions to resource allocation-both within and between …rms-and quantify their magnitudes. As a result we provide a new channel through which the nature of external credit markets may a¤ect the productivity and output of the economy. Our work suggests that resource allocation within …rm boundaries may play a larger role in determining macro outcomes such as business cycle ‡uctuations, total factor productivity and ultimately the path of growth, than has been generally believed.
Appendix:
In Table A1 of the Appendix we show that we obtain similar results as in Table II when we account for potential bias in measured productivity in our estimator using an oil price based shifter of dispersion in productivity across divisions of the conglomerate. In the reduced form estimation we instrument directly for dispersion in productivity. We take the …tted productivity of individual divisions based on their industry, c oil Kt , constructed as in Section V.A.4 and compute our instrument for dispersion in productivity Sd_oil as the standard deviation of the predicted division productivity for all divisions.
In Column (1), we …rst present the results from the …rst stage where we regress the dispersion of division productivity Dispersion on the instrument. As can be observed the relationship is positive strong and signi…cant. In particular, a one standard deviation change in the instrument (0.21) changes the dispersion among divisions by 0.3 standard deviations. This con…rms our premise that changes in oil prices explain changes in productivity dispersion of a conglomerate.
The results with the instrument are similar to those reported earlier.
In Column (2) we perform the baseline test of EV with the instrument while in Column (3) we conduct the analysis with the changing credit market conditions. Similarly, Columns (4) and (5) (1)). In particular, in Column (2) we …nd that diversi…ed …rms with more diverse investment opportunities have lower value as compared to a portfolio of comparable stand-alone …rms. And, Column (3) shows -as was the case in Table II -that there is also an increase in EV during periods when TED is higher for conglomerates which have diverse investment opportunities (coe¢ cient on Dispersion*TED is positive). Column (4) …nds that divisions inside conglomerates with diverse investment opportunities have investments that are less sensitive to Q. In addition, the investment to Q sensitivity is higher during high TED periods especially for conglomerates with diverse investment opportunities (Column (5)). The economic magnitudes in these tests are qualitatively similar to those reported in our analysis in the reduced form section. 
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Dispersion in Divisional Productivity and External Market Conditions
The sample is by division and year (Compustat segment files, . Division cash flow is defined as operating profits of the division plus division depreciation. Division sales, assets, capital expenditure and cash flow are in millions of dollars. Industry Q of the division in a given year is the median Q of the stand-alone firms in the same industry. Excess Value (EV) of a diversified firm is calculated as the log of the ratio of firm value of a diversified firm relative to the portfolio of stand-alone firms, with the stand-alone firm corresponding to each division of the conglomerate chosen based on the method of Lang and Stulz [1994] . Capital investment is measured as capital expenditure normalized by assets. Dispersion is defined as the standard deviation of the division (imputed) market-to-book ratio for a diversified firm. Dummy (Diversified) is an indicator variable that takes a value 1 if the firm has more than one division. TED spread is the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government T-bills. ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample is nonfinancial, unregulated firms from COMPUSTAT segment files from 1980 to 2006. In the first stage we recover the state transition function and the policy function for the diversified firms from the data. In the second stage we simulate the expected utility from different policy functions, and find the parameter that best satisfies the optimality condition. Both panels report the estimated structural parameters and the standard errors are in parentheses. Panel A reports the estimates using Q as a measure of productivity while while Panel B reports estimates with ROA as a measure of productivity. Table III) Figure 1: Excess value of conglomerates with high productivity dispersion relative to those with low productivity dispersion
EV
The figure plots excess value of conglomerates with high productivity dispersion relative to those with low productivity dispersion values over time. We use TED spread as an indicator of credit market conditions. It measures the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government T-bills. Excess Value (EV) of a diversified firm is calculated as the log of the ratio of firm value of a diversified firm relative to the portfolio of stand-alone firms, with the stand-alone firm corresponding to each division of the conglomerate chosen based on the method of Lang and Stulz [1994] . We sort the conglomerates into high and low productivity dispersion groups based on whether the standard deviation of productivity across the divisions of a firm is above or below sample median. We then plot the average excess value of each of the groups using only within firm variation (i.e., we demean excess value of each firm in the sample). The figure reports values based on the counterfactual exercise. We start with a random sample of conglomerate and stand alone data in the end of 2007 and expose the firms in the sample to realized values of our shifter of capital market conditions. TED spread is the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government T-bills. We forward simulate our model (based on parameters in Table III ) with simulations of productivity shocks from 2008 and shocks to TED from 2010 for 100 periods. Excess Value (EV) of a diversified firm is calculated as the log of the ratio of firm value of a diversified firm relative to the portfolio of stand-alone firms, with the stand-alone firm corresponding to each division of the conglomerate chosen based on the method of Lang and Stulz [1994] . Capital investment is measured as capital expenditure normalized by assets. All the estimates used in the forward simulation are based only on the data from 1980 to 2006. 
